Wert-Berater, Inc. is an independent assisted living feasibility study consultant preparing lender- and agency-ready studies for assisted living communities, memory care facilities, and senior care developments. Our analysis evaluates the age- and income-qualified household base, market penetration and required capture, licensed bed inventory and the competitive pipeline, achievable monthly rates and care-level revenue, care staffing ratios and wage cost, licensure and regulatory constraints, fill-up and stabilized occupancy, debt-service coverage, and downside sensitivity for SBA, USDA, conventional, and institutional financing.
Prepared for lenders, CDCs, and federal agencies to SBA SOP 50 10 8, USDA 7 CFR Part 5001, and conventional underwriting standards. Fiduciary duty runs to the lender and the agency, never the borrower. 4,000+ engagements since 1998 covering $41.2 billion in evaluated project value. So far in 2026: 41 engagements and $1.54 billion evaluated — 17 SBA, 11 USDA.
Assisted living feasibility quantifies the age- and income-qualified senior household base within the realistic family-decision draw area, tests it against licensed bed supply and pipeline, and models achievable monthly rates against the private-pay capacity the income distribution actually supports. Acuity mix, level-of-care pricing, and the memory-care component each carry their own economics. The operating model — care staffing ratios, wage pressure, agency-labor exposure — is analyzed as rigorously as demand, because senior care fails on labor more often than on census.
Methodology uses Census age-cohort and income data, state licensing and occupancy files, Genworth cost-of-care benchmarks, and BLS healthcare wage series, with named competitive facilities surveyed for rates and availability. The model carries census ramp, payer mix, and payroll sensitivity against the program coverage standard.
Every Wert-Berater financial model is fully linked with no hardcoded values, so any reviewer can stress any input. Deliverables comprise a complete narrative report and the linked Excel model, with ten-year pro forma, sensitivity analysis at ±5, 10, and 15 percent, interest-rate stress from +0.5 to +3.0 percent, and ratio analysis benchmarked against RMA and IBISWorld data.
SBA engagements are prepared to SOP 50 10 8, including its debt-service-coverage minimums of 1.15x operating and 1.00x global. USDA engagements follow RD Staff Instruction 5001 across the Business & Industry, Community Facilities, REAP, and Value-Added Producer Grant programs. Conventional engagements are built to the lender's stated coverage standard, typically 1.20x. Senior care reaches us through USDA B&I and Community Facilities for rural facilities and SBA or conventional structures for operator-owned projects; each study is built to the reviewing agency's evidentiary standard.
The firm's senior-care record includes the $1,700,000 acquisition of an operating 26-unit assisted living facility in Cortez, Colorado, prepared for the lender and USDA Rural Development under 7 CFR Part 5001, in which Year 1 revenue of $1,152,029 was underwritten at 90.5 per cent average occupancy — deliberately conservative against the 100 per cent occupancy confirmed by appraisal at the study date — and the transaction preserved nine rural healthcare jobs carrying $551,400 in annual local payroll. Independence is non-negotiable: determinations follow the evidence and are not revised under pressure, and studies are built to pass lender, agency, and third-party review without exception items.
An assisted living feasibility study consultant determines, independently of the sponsor, whether a proposed or acquired senior care community can fill its units at the rates assumed and generate cash flow sufficient to service the debt. Senior care is unusual in that it is simultaneously a real-estate credit and an operating-business credit, and a study that analyses only one of the two will not survive review. The work divides into six evidence streams.
Qualified demand. The starting point is the age-cohort population in a primary and secondary draw area sized to realistic family-decision geography rather than an arbitrary radius. That population is then filtered twice: by age, and by the income and asset position required to pay the proposed monthly rate for the expected length of stay. The second filter is the one weak studies omit, and it is usually where an apparently deep market turns shallow.
Competitive supply. Licensed capacity is counted from state licensure records rather than from marketing material, because licensed bed or unit counts and advertised capacity frequently differ. Existing communities are surveyed for occupancy, published and street rates, care-level pricing, unit mix, age and condition, and waiting lists. Permitted and announced projects are added to establish the supply the subject will face at stabilization.
Penetration and capture. The share of qualified households the project must attract is derived explicitly and compared with observed penetration in the market and in comparable markets. Where the required capture exceeds what the market has historically supported, the study says so.
Operating economics. Revenue is built from base rent by unit type plus care revenue by acuity level, second-person fees, and ancillary charges. Against it sit care and dietary staffing at surveyed local wage rates, management, marketing during fill-up, insurance, food, utilities, maintenance and reserves.
Regulatory and licensure. State licensure category, the care levels the licence permits, staffing ratios mandated by regulation, physical-plant requirements, certificate-of-need where applicable, and the licensure timeline all constrain the operating model and the opening date.
Capital and financial. Construction or acquisition cost, furniture and equipment, working capital through fill-up, the absorption curve, debt service, DSCR, breakeven occupancy and sensitivity testing complete the underwriting conclusion. Related asset classes are addressed under memory care, skilled nursing and CCRC and independent living.
Senior care is not one asset class, and using the wrong analytical frame is a common reason a study is returned. The four principal categories differ in who pays, what the licence permits, how staffing is regulated, and therefore how demand and coverage must be modelled.
Predominantly private-pay residential care with assistance in daily living but without skilled nursing. Demand is driven by age- and income-qualified households; revenue combines base rent with tiered care charges; the principal risks are income qualification depth, fill-up pace and care-staff wage inflation. This is the frame used on this page.
Dedicated dementia care in a secured setting, at higher staffing ratios and higher monthly rates. The qualified base is narrower — dementia prevalence within the age cohort, filtered again by ability to pay a premium rate — and the operating model is more labour-intensive. A memory care wing inside an assisted living community is modelled as a separate revenue and cost centre, not blended into the whole. See memory care feasibility studies.
Licensed medical care under a reimbursement architecture rather than a private-pay rate structure. Payer mix, per-diem rates set by programme rather than by the market, mandated nurse-staffing levels and regulatory survey history dominate the analysis. A private-pay demand model applied to a skilled nursing facility will be wrong. See skilled nursing feasibility studies.
Real-estate-forward senior housing where residents arrive by choice rather than by need. Demand is discretionary, sensitive to housing-market liquidity because residents typically fund entry by selling a home, and driven by marketing and absorption rather than by acuity. Entrance-fee structures introduce a further layer the model must carry. See CCRC and independent living feasibility studies.
A complete engagement covers every layer of evidence a credit officer needs to underwrite a licensed senior care facility: market demand, competitive supply, operating economics, staffing cost, and debt-service capacity. Because assisted living projects carry both real-estate risk and operating-company risk simultaneously, the study addresses both in a single integrated model rather than treating them as separate workstreams.
Demand for assisted living is not a simple population count. The qualifying household must clear two simultaneous screens: the primary resident must fall within the relevant age cohort, and the household must carry sufficient income or assets to sustain private-pay monthly rates over a multi-year tenure. Both screens are applied before any demand figure is accepted.
Age-cohort data is drawn from Census Bureau decennial files and American Community Survey five-year estimates, disaggregated to the tract level and reaggregated to the actual draw area. Income distribution data from the same ACS files is used to estimate the private-pay-capable share of the qualifying age cohort, cross-referenced against Genworth cost-of-care survey benchmarks for the state and metropolitan area.
Competitive supply is built from state health department licensing registries, which publish facility names, licensed bed counts, and in many states current occupancy. That file is supplemented by certificate-of-need applications where the state operates a CON program, by local building-permit records for projects under construction, and by direct telephone surveys of named competing facilities to confirm current rates, availability, and any planned expansions. The survey captures unit type, care level, and base monthly rate so that the proposed project's pricing can be tested against what the market is actually charging and what private-pay households can actually sustain.
Counting the age-eligible population is the easy half of senior care demand analysis and, on its own, is close to meaningless. A market can hold a large and rapidly growing seventy-five-plus population and still not support a new community, because the question is not how many older adults live nearby but how many can pay the proposed monthly rate for the expected duration of stay without exhausting their resources.
The analysis therefore applies a second filter to the age cohort: household income, and where the data supports it, asset position — principally home equity, since a substantial share of private-pay residents fund care by liquidating a residence. The income threshold is derived from the project's own proposed rate structure rather than from a generic multiple, and it is applied at the care levels the community intends to offer, because a resident who qualifies for base rent may not qualify once tiered care charges are added.
Geography matters as much as arithmetic. Senior care draw areas are set by where adult children live and travel from, not by concentric rings, so the study defines primary and secondary areas against road networks, natural barriers and observed referral patterns. From the qualified household count and the proposed unit count the required penetration rate follows directly, and that figure is then tested against penetration observed at existing communities in the same market and in comparable markets. This firm publishes no universal acceptable penetration rate, because the defensible level varies with market maturity, rate position and competitive depth; what the study must show is why the required capture is achievable in this market, with evidence.
Competitive supply in senior care is counted from state licensure records, because licensed capacity is the operative constraint and it frequently differs from the unit count a community advertises. The study records licensed beds or units by category, distinguishes assisted living from memory care and skilled nursing capacity within the same campus, and notes the care levels each licence actually permits.
Each competitor is then surveyed directly rather than desk-researched: current occupancy, published rates and the street rates actually being transacted, care-level pricing structure, second-person fees, unit mix and sizes, building age and condition, recent renovation, waiting lists where they exist, and any concessions being offered. Concessions are diagnostic — a market where incumbents are discounting is not a market with unmet demand, whatever the population data suggests.
The pipeline is added next: permitted projects, announced developments, and expansions at existing communities, each assessed for likelihood and expected opening date against the subject's own stabilization horizon. Finally the subject is positioned within the surveyed rate range, and the study states plainly whether the proposed rate sits at, above or below the prevailing market and what that position implies for absorption. A rate premium is not disqualifying, but it must be justified by product, location or care offering rather than assumed.
Senior care pro formas are sensitive to a small number of inputs that interact in ways that can move a project from bankable to unbankable within a narrow range. Identifying those inputs and stress-testing each one is the analytical core of the engagement.
Labour is the dominant expense in assisted living and the line most often understated in sponsor projections. Care staffing is not discretionary: state regulation prescribes minimum ratios, those ratios rise with resident acuity, and the community competes for the same caregivers, nurses and dietary staff as every hospital, skilled nursing facility and home-health agency in the region.
The study builds staffing from the regulatory requirement and the projected acuity mix rather than from a percentage of revenue, then prices it at surveyed local wage rates for each role. Because acuity drifts upward as a resident population ages in place, the staffing model is projected forward rather than held flat, and the resulting cost curve is carried into coverage. Agency and contract labour are addressed explicitly where the local market indicates they will be needed, since agency premiums can consume the margin a base-wage model shows.
Turnover is treated as a cost rather than a footnote, because recruitment, onboarding and overtime backfill are real and recurring in this sector. Alongside labour sit dietary and food cost per resident day, housekeeping, activities, utilities, insurance priced for a licensed care setting, marketing — which runs heavily during fill-up and then settles — management fees, property taxes at the assessment the project will actually face, and replacement reserves.
Revenue is modelled as base rent by unit type plus care revenue by acuity tier, second-person occupancy fees, community or entrance fees where the structure provides for them, and ancillary services. Blending these into a single average monthly rate hides the mix risk that usually decides the outcome, so they are carried separately.
Fill-up is modelled month by month rather than annually. Senior care absorption is slow, marketing-dependent and front-loaded with cost, and the operating loss accumulated between opening and stabilization is frequently the largest single financing requirement in the project. The study sizes the working capital needed to carry that period and states the assumed months to stabilization.
Underwriting runs a ten-year linked projection in which the income statement, balance sheet and cash-flow statement derive from one assumption set, so a change to occupancy, rate or wage cost flows through coverage automatically. Against that the study reports debt service, DSCR by year, breakeven occupancy, and sensitivity cases run independently on stabilized occupancy, achieved monthly rate, care-staff wage cost, fill-up pace and interest rate — then a combined downside case in which slower fill, softer rates and higher wages occur together, which is how they tend to occur in practice.
SBA, USDA, and conventional lenders each bring a distinct evidentiary standard to senior care transactions, but all three share a common concern: the operating company and the real estate are financially interdependent, and a stress event on either side can impair the other.
Under SBA SOP 50 10 8, the study must support a debt-service-coverage ratio of at least 1.15x on an operating basis and 1.00x on a global basis. For senior care, SBA reviewers pay particular attention to the census ramp assumption and the labor-cost build, because both are frequent sources of optimism bias in sponsor-prepared projections. The independent study is expected to document the basis for each assumption and to show coverage at stressed inputs, not only at the base case.
USDA Business & Industry and Community Facilities programs are the dominant financing structures for rural assisted living facilities. RD Staff Instruction 5001 requires an independent feasibility study as a condition of application. USDA reviewers focus on the private-pay capacity of the rural trade area, which is frequently thinner than urban markets, and on the operator’s demonstrated ability to recruit and retain direct-care staff in a rural labor market.
Conventional lenders typically require 1.20x coverage and place additional weight on operator track record, management agreement terms, and the facility’s state survey history. A study prepared for conventional underwriting documents each of those factors explicitly.
Both documents arrive in the same credit file and they are routinely confused, but they answer different questions and neither substitutes for the other. An appraisal answers a value question — what the property is worth, as of a date, under a defined value premise. A feasibility study answers a viability question — whether the project as proposed can achieve the occupancy, rates and operating margin required to service the debt.
The distinction matters more in senior care than in most asset classes, because the value of a licensed care community is inseparable from the business operating inside it. Property whose value depends on an operating enterprise is handled on the valuation side under going-concern appraisal; the feasibility study is the separate independent analysis of whether that enterprise can perform as projected. An over-collateralised senior care deal can still be infeasible, and a strongly feasible one can appraise below cost.
The efficient sequence runs feasibility first, or in parallel, rather than after the appraisal: the study's tested operating projections give the appraiser a supported income basis, and its identification of licensure, staffing or absorption constraints surfaces before the valuation is built on assumptions that will not hold.
The fee is fixed and quoted within one business day of an inquiry. No portion of the fee is contingent on the finding, and the determination is not revised because a sponsor disagrees with it. The fixed structure means a lender or agency receives an opinion that was formed without financial pressure toward any particular conclusion.
Standard delivery is ten to fifteen business days from receipt of a complete data room. The data room for an assisted living engagement typically includes the site address and legal description, the proposed unit count and care-level mix, the operator’s proposed rate schedule, any existing appraisal or market study, state licensing correspondence, and the operator’s historical financial statements if the facility is an acquisition or conversion. Rush delivery is available when a credit committee or agency deadline requires it.
Every engagement is published to a secure client portal. The financial model in the portal is the same fully linked Excel workbook delivered at closing — no hardcoded values, every input exposed — and it remains live so that a reviewer can change an occupancy assumption, a wage rate, or an interest rate and watch the coverage ratio recalculate in real time. For senior care transactions, where lenders frequently want to run their own stress scenarios on direct-care labor or census ramp, that live model eliminates the back-and-forth of requesting revised outputs. The narrative report, the model, and the statement of conditions are all accessible through the same portal from the day of delivery.
Senior care engagements are directed by Donald Safranek, MSc, principal of Wert-Berater, Inc., who is responsible for the determinations in the report. The firm's qualifications are in market, economic, financial and management analysis for institutional and agency lending.
Scope of practice. Wert-Berater prepares independent feasibility analysis. It does not provide clinical, medical or care-planning advice, does not perform licensure consulting or represent applicants before state licensing authorities, does not provide architectural or engineering design, and does not operate or manage senior care communities. The firm holds no USDA or SBA approval status and no lender certification, and does not represent otherwise. It also does not hold itself out as having HUD Section 232 or HUD MAP-lender experience; senior care studies described here are prepared for SBA, USDA guaranteed lending, USDA Community Facilities, conventional and institutional credits. Where clinical, licensure, architectural or engineering documentation exists, it is treated as an input to the feasibility analysis and relied upon as prepared by the qualified professionals who issued it. Last reviewed 2 September 2026.
The fee is fixed and quoted within one business day of an inquiry. It does not vary with the finding, and no portion is contingent on loan approval. Because scope differs by project size, unit mix, and program — SBA, USDA, or conventional — the firm quotes each engagement individually rather than publishing a schedule.
Standard delivery is ten to fifteen business days from receipt of a complete data room. Rush delivery is available when an agency submission deadline or credit committee date requires a shorter window. The clock starts when the data room is complete, so assembling site, licensing, and operator documents before ordering the study compresses the timeline most reliably.
Assisted living carries simultaneous real-estate and operating-company risk. Revenue depends on occupancy, acuity mix, and private-pay rate sustainability all at once, while the largest expense — direct-care labor — is driven by state staffing mandates and local wage pressure that operators cannot fully control. A census shortfall and a wage spike can compound each other faster than in most other property types.
No. A feasibility study is an evidence-based determination of whether a project is financially viable under stated assumptions. It is one element of a lender’s or agency’s credit decision. Wert-Berater’s fiduciary duty runs to the lender and reviewing agency, not to the borrower, and the firm makes no representation about approval outcomes.
The primary sources are Census Bureau age-cohort and income data at the tract level, state health department licensing registries for competitive bed supply, Genworth cost-of-care benchmarks, and direct telephone surveys of competing facilities for current rates and availability. Certificate-of-need filings and local permit records are reviewed for pipeline supply not yet reflected in licensing files.
Generally, no. SBA SOP 50 10 8 and USDA RD Staff Instruction 5001 each specify their own evidentiary standards, coverage minimums, and required analytical elements. A study built to one standard may not satisfy the other. If a project is being presented to both programs simultaneously, the engagement scope and the coverage analysis should be structured to address both sets of requirements from the outset.
An assisted living feasibility study consultant determines, independently of the sponsor, whether a proposed or acquired senior care community can fill its units at the rates assumed and cover its debt service. In practice that means sizing the age- and income-qualified household base in a realistic draw area, counting licensed competitive capacity from state records and surveying its occupancy and rates, deriving the penetration the project requires and testing it against what the market has actually supported, building care staffing from regulatory ratios at surveyed local wages, and running a ten-year financial projection with coverage and sensitivity testing.
Because senior care is both a real-estate credit and an operating-business credit, the study addresses both in one integrated model. The consultant's duty runs to the lender or the agency rather than to the sponsor, the fee is not contingent on the finding, and the study can and does conclude that a project is not feasible as proposed.
Demand begins with the age cohort in the primary and secondary draw areas, but the age count alone is not demand. That population is filtered by the income and, where data permits, the asset position required to pay the project's own proposed monthly rate for the expected length of stay — including tiered care charges, not base rent alone. Home equity is considered where the market's residents typically fund care by selling a residence.
Draw areas are defined by where adult children live and travel from, using road networks and observed referral patterns rather than concentric rings, because the placement decision is usually a family decision. From the resulting qualified household count and the proposed unit count, the study derives the penetration rate the project must achieve and compares it against penetration observed at existing communities locally and in comparable markets.
The penetration rate expresses the share of age- and income-qualified households in the draw area that a community must attract as residents in order to reach its projected occupancy. It is the single figure that connects the demographic analysis to the revenue projection, and it is where an optimistic study is most easily exposed.
The rate is derived rather than asserted: qualified households on one side, proposed units and target occupancy on the other. It is then benchmarked against penetration actually achieved by existing communities in the same market, since that is the only direct evidence of what the market supports. This firm does not publish a universal acceptable threshold, because the defensible level depends on market maturity, rate positioning and competitive depth. What the study must demonstrate is that the required capture is achievable here, with evidence, and it must say so plainly when it is not.
Supply is counted from state licensure records rather than from advertised unit counts, because the licence defines the operative capacity and the care levels a community may legally provide. Assisted living, memory care and skilled nursing capacity are counted separately even where they sit on one campus, since they serve different demand pools.
Each competitor is then surveyed directly for occupancy, published and transacted rates, care-level pricing, second-person fees, unit mix and size, building age and condition, waiting lists, and any concessions currently offered. Concessions are treated as evidence in their own right: incumbents discounting into a supposedly undersupplied market is a contradiction the study must resolve. Permitted and announced projects are then layered in against the subject's stabilization date, so the comparison is to the supply that will exist, not the supply that exists now.
Staffing is built from the bottom up rather than as a percentage of revenue. The study starts from the staffing ratios the state licence mandates, adjusts them for the projected acuity mix, and prices each role — caregivers, licensed nurses, dietary, housekeeping, activities, administration — at surveyed local wage rates for the specific labour market rather than at a national average.
Two dynamics are carried forward explicitly. Acuity drifts upward as a resident population ages in place, so the staffing requirement rises over the projection rather than staying flat. And senior care competes for caregivers with hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and home-health agencies in the same region, so wage pressure and turnover cost — recruitment, onboarding, overtime backfill and agency premiums where the market requires them — are modelled rather than assumed away. Care-staff wage cost receives its own sensitivity case, because it is both large and volatile.
A credit officer reads a senior care study for four things. First, that demand has been qualified by income and not merely counted by age. Second, that competitive supply was verified from licensure records and surveyed directly, including the pipeline that will be open at stabilization. Third, that the required penetration is stated explicitly and benchmarked against what the market has actually supported. Fourth, that operating expenses — particularly care staffing — were built from regulatory requirements and local wages rather than from industry ratios.
Beyond content, lenders look for a study that can be audited. Sources are cited, the competitor survey is presented rather than summarised, the assumption set appears in one place, and the sensitivity cases are shown. The objective is a report that passes lender, agency and third-party review without exception items.
Yes. Rural assisted living is regularly financed through USDA Rural Development guaranteed lending, and independent feasibility analysis is required or strongly indicated for most such credits. The firm's senior-care work includes an assisted living acquisition prepared for the lender and USDA Rural Development under 7 CFR Part 5001.
Independence in the USDA sense means the analyst's fee is not contingent on the finding and the determination is not subject to revision at the borrower's request. A study prepared by the borrower, by an affiliate, or by a consultant engaged on a contingent basis will not satisfy that requirement. Where the project is sponsored by a public body or non-profit and serves an essential community need, USDA Community Facilities may be the applicable programme instead, and the essentiality analysis differs accordingly. Programme requirements are verified against the current agency instruction at engagement.
Yes. Assisted living communities are financed under both SBA 7(a) and 504, and SBA SOP 50 10 8 requires or strongly indicates an independent feasibility study where repayment depends on projections rather than demonstrated historical performance — which covers ground-up development, substantial expansion, and most changes of ownership.
Senior care is also treated as a special-purpose property with a significant operating-business component, which raises the evidentiary bar: the building has limited alternative use, so the loan is repaid by the operation or not at all. The study is scoped so the operating analysis carries at least as much weight as the real-estate analysis. Current requirements are confirmed against the operative SOP at engagement rather than assumed, since the SOP is revised periodically.
They differ in who pays and what the licence permits, and those two facts drive everything else. Assisted living is predominantly private-pay residential care with tiered care charges; demand turns on income-qualified household depth. Memory care serves a narrower base — dementia prevalence within the age cohort, filtered again by ability to pay a premium rate — at higher staffing ratios. Skilled nursing operates under a reimbursement architecture in which payer mix and programme-set per-diem rates replace market rate-setting, and mandated nurse staffing governs cost.
CCRC and independent living is real-estate-forward housing chosen rather than needed, so demand is discretionary and sensitive to housing-market liquidity, and entrance-fee structures add a layer the model must carry. Applying a private-pay assisted living frame to a skilled nursing project, or an acuity-driven frame to independent living, produces a study that will not survive review.
An appraisal answers a value question — what the property is worth as of a date under a defined premise. A feasibility study answers a viability question — whether the project as proposed can reach the occupancy, rates and margin needed to service the debt. Both commonly appear in the same credit file and neither substitutes for the other.
The distinction is sharper in senior care because the value of a licensed community is inseparable from the business operating within it; valuation of such property is handled as a going-concern assignment, while the feasibility study independently tests whether that going concern can perform as projected. An over-collateralised senior care deal can still be infeasible. The efficient sequence runs feasibility first or in parallel, so the appraiser works from tested operating projections rather than from assumptions the study would have disproved.
Coverage is reported year by year across the projection rather than at stabilization alone, because a senior care project's weakest coverage falls during fill-up, when marketing and staffing costs run ahead of census. From the base case the model runs independent sensitivity cases on the variables that actually move the outcome: stabilized occupancy, achieved monthly rate, care-staff wage cost, months to stabilization, and interest rate.
Each is tested in isolation to identify the credit's principal exposure, and then a combined downside case is run in which fill-up is slower, rates are softer and wages are higher simultaneously — the correlated scenario, since these conditions tend to arrive together. The study reports the breakeven occupancy at which coverage reaches 1.00x, and the working capital required to carry the operation to that point.
Standard delivery is ten to fifteen business days from receipt of a complete data room, with rush delivery quoted at engagement. The clock starts when the file is complete, not when the engagement is signed, so assembling the data room promptly is the single largest determinant of the delivery date.
For a senior care project the file should include the site location and any survey or site plan, the unit mix and count by type, the proposed rate schedule including care-level pricing, the construction or acquisition budget, the licensure category sought or held, any existing licensure correspondence, the proposed staffing plan, the management or operator agreement and the operator's track record, sponsor financials where applicable, and for an acquisition, historical census, payer mix and operating statements. Where a document does not yet exist, the study states the assumption standing in its place so the lender can see what remains unverified.
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Wert-Berater, Inc. is an independent provider of feasibility studies and other related services. The firm does not provide financing or equity investment advice, and does not arrange, broker, or place debt or equity capital of any kind.
All appraisal assignments are performed by Bruce E. Jones, MAI, ASA-GC, BCA, CMEA, a member of the Appraisal Institute since 2006, a staff member of Wert-Berater, Inc. and owner of Special Purpose Realty Valuation.